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Minimum Wage Channels of Adjustment
* 
 
The economic impact of the 2007-2009 increases in the federal minimum wage (MW) is 
analyzed using a sample of quick-service restaurants in Georgia and Alabama. Store-level 
biweekly payroll records for individual employees are used, allowing us to precisely measure 
the MW compliance cost for each restaurant. We examine a broad range of adjustment 
channels in addition to employment, including hours, prices, turnover, training, performance 
standards, and non-labor costs. Exploiting variation in the cost impact of the MW across 
restaurants, we find no significant effect of the MW increases on employment or hours over 
the three years. Cost increases were instead absorbed through other channels of adjustment, 
including higher prices, lower profit margins, wage compression, reduced turnover, and 
higher performance standards. These findings are compared with MW predictions from 
competitive, monopsony, and institutional/behavioral models; the latter appears to fit best in 
the short run. 
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I. Introduction 
The minimum wage (MW) is the most researched and debated policy issue in American labor 
economics (Hamermesh 2009).
1 At first glance, this seems odd. The U.S. minimum wage is low by 
international standards, currently covers a tiny percentage of the workforce, and in real terms is not high 
compared to historic U.S. values. What makes the MW so controversial? Part of the explanation is that it 
stands as a marker in ongoing debates over the relative size and merits of free markets versus government 
regulation. We have little to say about this debate, but contribute on two other fronts – MW empirical 
evidence and its implications for theory. Despite decades of research, pinning-down the labor market 
effects of MW has proven elusive and controversy continues over the most appropriate model of labor 
markets for explaining and evaluating these effects.  
We hope to provide useful insights on both fronts. To do so, we shift MW analysis to a focus on 
what we call “channels of adjustment” (CoA). The CoA idea can be broadly likened to the “transmission 
mechanism” in monetary theory or “tax incidence” in public finance. That is, a binding minimum wage 
adds to the price of labor and CoA examines the channels through which this cost increase changes the 
behavior of firms, with impacts on workers, consumers, owners, and other agents. Alternative models of 
labor markets emphasize different mixes and strengths of adjustment channels.  
The event examined is the three-step increase in the U.S. minimum wage, from $5.15 to $5.85 in 
July 2007, to $6.55 in July 2008, and to $7.25 in July 2009, an increase of $2.10 (41%). In this paper we 
briefly discuss MW predictions from three alternative models – competitive, monopsony, and 
institutional/behavioral, and compare them with evidence from our data set. Among the CoA identified 
are employment, hours, prices, profits, training, work effort, human resource practices, operational 
efficiencies, and internal wage structure.  
The empirical evidence comes from a unique multi-part data set collected for quick-service 
restaurants located in Georgia and Alabama and owned by three franchisees. Our investigation starts with 
the most intensively examined adjustment channel, changes in employment and hours. We rely on large 
                                                            
1 An October 2011 electronic search of the EconLit data base on the subject “minimum wage,” limited to journal 
articles since January 2000 and North America, brings up 147 research studies (plus 21 more for living wage). 2 
 
exogenous variation across the restaurants in the “bite” of the MW to identify causal effects on 
employment and hours worked. Although not problem free, these data provide advances in at least three 
respects. First, our measure of the MW payroll “gap” (or treatment) is calculated from individual worker 
payroll data provided by the franchisees, an improvement over store-level averages or industry-level 
aggregates used in other studies (Card and Krueger, 1994; Dube et al., 2007), allowing us to measure 
precisely each restaurant’s wage bill compliance costs resulting from each MW hike. Second, the data are 
from store-level electronic payroll records and thus relatively free of measurement error. Third, the data 
extend over three years, containing information before and after each of the three MW increases, and thus 
reflect both short- and medium-run adjustments. 
Information on other channels of adjustment comes from data provided by franchise owners, a 
separately administered written survey of restaurant managers, and qualitative/anecdotal data collected 
from field-level interviews with restaurant owners and managers. We also construct a statistical profile of 
workforce characteristics based on a survey of individual employees.  
In what follows, we briefly discuss theory, with emphasis on alternative approaches and adjustment 
channels, along with prior literature most relevant to the paper. We then describe data sources, survey 
instruments, estimation strategies, and evidence on employment and non-employment adjustment 
channels from the MW. In the concluding section we summarize the implications of the CoA evidence 
with respect to alternative labor market models.   
II. Adjustment Channels: Theory 
Prior studies have presented labor market models and shown predicted MW effects (for surveys, see 
Card and Krueger 1995; Brown 1999). In what follows, we (1) link the predicted effects to underlying 
channels of adjustment, (2) expand the traditional focus from employment effects to a broader array of 
adjustment margins, and (3) compare predicted CoA across three different labor market models – 
competitive, monopsony, and institutional/behavioral.  
A. Competitive 
The competitive model provides the standard base-line for evaluating the MW. The model comes in 3 
 
different versions, starting with the simple textbook model and then extended to include human capital, 
worker heterogeneity, job search, and other such additions (see Card and Krueger, 1995, Table 11.1). 
Widely agreed-upon core components, however, are a negatively sloped labor demand curve and a wage 
rate that clears the market and is parametric to individual agents.  
Starting from a competitive equilibrium, a minimum wage is predicted to move firms up their labor 
demand curves and decrease employment, the adjustment channel most examined in the literature. The 
magnitude of the employment reduction depends on the elasticity of labor demand and, with 
heterogeneous labor, the proportion of a firm’s workforce affected by the MW. Demand elasticity is 
determined through scale and substitution effects, as seen in the Marshall-Hicks laws of derived demand, 
with ease of substitution in production by firms and in consumption among households increasing with 
time. Changes in the MW operate at both the firm and market levels. In the case of a nationwide MW, 
large numbers of restaurants will be affected, albeit by different amounts. Hence, akin to tax incidence 
some portion of the cost increase is likely passed forward to consumers and backward to suppliers of 
labor, capital, and other inputs.  
With fixed employment costs and worker heterogeneity, firms may reduce work hours but maintain 
headcount. Employment/hours adjustment may also be affected by wage-related changes in employee 
work effort and productivity (as in an efficiency wage model), although this extension to the model may 
take it outside of what is typically considered “competitive.”
2 Employment/hours adjustment may not 
occur, however, if firms do not comply with the mandate or, alternatively, workers undo the loss of jobs á 
la private bargaining and the Coase theorem (Ippolito 2003).  
Numerous other CoA predictions follow from versions of the competitive model. If the MW reduces 
profitability below the normal level, the number of businesses in affected markets should shrink over the 
long run until normal returns are restored. Other adjustment channels include: downward pressure on 
                                                            
2 The degree to which the textbook model can be “stretched” and remain competitive in the theoretical sense is not 
well established. We try to strike a balance and admit extensions that do not conflict with a downward sloping labor 
demand curve and (approximately) parametric wage. By these criteria, heterogeneous labor and wage dispersion due 
to imperfect information are consistent with the competitive model, but an efficiency wage effect is not because the 
firm sets the wage (as in monopsony) and the labor demand curve may not be entirely downward sloping.  4 
 
wages in the uncovered sector (where such exists), reduced general on-the-job training, reduction in 
benefits and other perquisites, labor-labor substitution (e.g., shift from less-skilled toward more skilled 
workers), reduced turnover and more selective hiring, and greater ease in filling vacancies. With 
homogeneous labor, the internal wage structure remains a point (all paid MW); with heterogeneous labor 
the lower part of the internal wage distribution is cut off but the part above MW remains the same absent 
behavioral-type relativities. The competitive model assumes firms minimize cost and hence in the 
textbook model no room exists for managers to improve operational efficiency or reduce slack. In a more 
nuanced version where managerial time and attention are scarce resources, one can interpret “reducing 
slack” as a cost minimizing redirection of managerial resources in response to a relative price change 
(Stigler 1966).  
B. Monopsony 
In recent years the major rival model for examining the MW is some variant of the monopsony 
model. First developed by Robinson (1933), it now comes in several versions – typically being either 
“classic” (structural) or “new” (dynamic) monopsony. The former is predicated on one or only a few 
employers in a labor market and the latter on market frictions related to hiring, turnover, search, and 
mobility costs on the supply side (Manning 2003). Although the particulars differ, core components of 
monopsony models are an upward sloping labor supply curve facing firms and some discretion in wage-
setting made possible by a “thinness” in the market (due, say, to spatial location, firm-specific skills, etc.).  
As applied to MW channels of adjustment, the sharpest difference between the competitive and 
monopsony models is prediction of employment effects. For MW increases that push below-competitive 
wages toward competitive levels, classic and new monopsony models predict an employment and/or 
hours rise rather than fall. MW increases above competitive levels decrease employment, just as in the 
competitive model. These results are qualified but not reversed with models of oligopsony and 
monopsonistic competition (Bhaskar and To 1999; Manning 2003).  
Monopsony models provide other differences in predicted CoA as compared to the competitive 
model. The rise in employment, for example, expands industry output (until the MW equals the 5 
 
competitive wage) and product price should fall (product market structure matters here – see Bhaskar and 
To 1999). In classic monopsony profits fall and the firm(s) may exit in the long-run; in new monopsony 
the profit effect may be offset by savings from decreased turnover (Card and Krueger 1995). Unlike the 
competitive model, expenditures on general training may increase because the employer can capture some 
of the return. In structural monopsony with homogeneous labor, the MW effect on the internal wage 
structure mirrors the competitive model (a higher wage paid to all) while in dynamic monopsony the 
firms’s wage distribution narrows (by eliminating differential supply prices for workers in the low end of 
the distribution) (Booth and Zoega 2008). Although not an issue concerning CoA per se, the monopsony 
model suggests that at least within a range an increase in the MW can enhance labor market efficiency.  
C. Institutional/Behavioral. 
The institutional model of labor markets was the dominant paradigm for evaluating the MW into the 
1950s and provided the principal theoretical rationale behind the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(the nation’s first federal MW) in 1938 (Craypo 1997). In the last half-century, however, it has gradually 
faded from consideration in the labor economics literature, partly due to lack of formalization but also 
because several of the key ideas have been absorbed into neoclassical-based models such as efficiency 
wage theory and search models. Since a behavioral/social model of the human agent (e.g., bounded 
rationality, relativities) is a core component of the institutional paradigm, it draws on complementary 
concepts and models in the field of behavioral economics (Kaufman 1999; Thaler 2000).  
Past and present writings in the institutional tradition emphasize several central ideas: rejection of a 
well-defined downward sloping labor demand curve; labor markets that are imperfectly competitive, 
institutionally segmented, socially embedded, and prone to excess supply; and the importance of 
technological and psycho-social factors in firm-level production systems and internal labor markets 
(ILMs) as determinants of cost and productivity (Taylor and Pierson 1957; Arrowsmith et al. 2003; 
Brosnan 2003; Kaufman 1988, 2010; Osterman 2011). Regarding efficiency and welfare, the institutional 
model is similar to the monopsony model in that a MW may improve efficiency and welfare over a 
moderate range; the CoA sources of welfare gain, however, are not identical.  6 
 
A key institutional position is that a moderate MW boost may have, particularly in the short-run, an 
approximately zero or small positive employment effect (Lester 1946, 1960). The reason hinges less on a 
monopsony upward sloping supply argument and more on characteristics of the firm’s labor demand 
curve and accompanying production/ILM system. The institutional short-run labor demand relationship is 
a thick band rather than a line; accordingly, a moderate rise in the MW may lead to no employment/hours 
decline if the negative cost effect is stymied or counter-balanced by (1) indivisibilities and 
complementarities in production that prevent marginal employment adjustments (e.g., a team form of 
production, per Alchian and Demsetz 1972), (2) positive effects of higher productivity from enhanced 
work effort; (3) tighter labor standards and greater managerial/operational “tightening-up” in production 
and ILMs, and (4) increased sales as a higher MW leads to expanded consumer spending (e.g., a 
Keynesian income effect). Even if employment declines, this may be socially beneficial. A MW may 
force out of business inefficient and sometimes exploitative firms (Arrowsmith et al. 2003; Kaufman 
2010).  
The institutional model addresses other CoA. For example, it posits that the typical firm’s production 
function features constant-to-declining marginal costs and falling unit fixed costs up to the technical full 
capacity level, implying the firm’s output is typically demand-constrained (rather than cost constrained). 
The first-line response of firm owners to a MW increase, therefore, is not to reduce output and lay off 
workers (the competitive response) but search for ways to absorb the cost impact by increasing volume 
through expanded sales from marketing, improved service, and general economic expansion (Lester 
1946). At the same time, MW cost impacts can partially be offset by reducing organizational slack and 
improving operational efficiency. Managers maximize utility but satisfice with respect to profit to the 
degree that principle-agent constraints permit and profits exceed a threshold “survival” level. The costs 
that are not absorbed through these methods are passed on through a cost/price mark-up rule, albeit with 
volume maintenance being a crucial constraint. 
Human-related determinants of productivity and cost are particularly stressed; hence, in response to 
the MW it is more likely that headcount and hours will be maintained (e.g., “take-aways” hurt morale and 7 
 
engender retaliation). Higher productivity is achieved through tighter human resource practices (e.g., 
scheduling), increased performance standards and work effort, and enhanced customer service. Costs of 
turnover plus a surplus of job seekers in typical years provide firms with some monopsony-like power. 
Thus, in reaction to a MW increase, firms may increase on-the-job training. More so than others, the 
institutional model predicts that even with homogeneous labor a higher MW leads to a “ripple effect” in 
the internal wage structure as managers raise the pay of above-MW employees to maintain morale and 
relativities – perhaps still allowing some internal compression given mobility costs for senior workers. 
III. Empirical Evidence 
For space reasons we do not survey the voluminous empirical literature on minimum wage laws, 
apart from a brief overview of important issues bearing on estimation of MW employment effects. The 
early minimum wage literature consisted primarily of national time-series studies examining the 
employment responses with respect to changes in federal MW laws. These typically found negative but 
low teenage employment elasticities with respect to the MW, on the order of -0.1 to -0.3 with more recent 
studies indicating the lower elasticities (for surveys, see Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1995; 
Neumark and Wascher, 2008).  
Newer studies rely heavily on cross-sectional as well as time variation in the MW. Cross-section 
variation stems from two principal sources. One is the difference in prevailing wages across markets; 
hence MW has greater “bite” in low-wage than high-wage markets. The second is substantial growth in 
the number of states with state minima exceeding the federal minimum, at least prior to the 2007-2009 
increases. Thus, introduction of federal MW increases should not impact (or barely impact) markets with 
high state minima while having larger impacts on states without binding state mandates.  
Two broad groups of cross-section, quasi-experimental studies have emerged. The first typically 
uses the Current Population Survey (CPS) or other national household survey data to examine how 
employment effects vary with differential exposure to state and Federal minimum wage laws. Applying 
panel techniques to estimate employment effects for teenagers or low-skilled workers, these studies 
typically (but not always) obtain evidence of adverse employment effects, with employment elasticities 8 
 
on the order of from -0.2 to -0.3 (Neumark and Wascher, 1992, 2007; Burkhauser et al., 2000; Sabia, 
2009; see Orrenius and Zavodny, 2007, for an exception). 
The second group of cross-sectional studies, of which our work is an example, is based on the 
differential impact of the policy change on samples of establishments, most often in fast-food or retail 
industries where one might expect the largest MW impact. This “quasi-experimental” approach uses 
variants of difference-in-difference estimates to evaluate the minimum wage effects. Best known is the 
work by Card and Krueger (1994), who uncovered small positive or insignificant employment effects in a 
sample of fast-food restaurants in New Jersey where the minimum wage was raised through state law, 
relative to the stores in the nearby Pennsylvania where the minimum wage did not change. A number of 
studies have followed in this tradition, typically finding small and insignificant employment effects from 
minimum wages. For instance, Dube et al. (2007) adopt a similar econometric approach to investigate the 
economic effects of a citywide minimum wage in San Francisco, relative to the neighboring Alameda 
County, and do not detect any significant employment loss attributable to the mandate.   
Among the concerns with the nation-wide MW studies have been inadequate controls of unobserved 
heterogeneity in employment growth across states and the presence of spatial autocorrelation with 
inconsistent standard errors and, in the establishment studies, a lack of external validity due to a limited 
geographic focus and insufficient lag times to capture the full minimum wage effects. Recent studies have 
attempted to address these limitations. Addison et al. (forthcoming) examine county-level employment at 
the restaurant-and-bar sector from 1990-2006 and incorporate trends in this sector’s employment to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in employment growth; the finding is no support for a negative 
employment effect. Dube et al. (2010) use minimum wage policy discontinuities at state borders to 
identify the effects of MW on earnings and employment in restaurant and other low-wage sectors within 
contiguous county pairs between 1990 and 2006. Their findings also reveal the presence of spurious 
negative employment effects due to heterogeneity in employment trends. A recent examination of the 
2007-2009 MW increases by Addison et al. (2011) uses three national data sets and finds little evidence 
for MW employment effects or any “recession multiplier” of such effects.  9 
 
In a paper more closely related to our study, Giuliano (forthcoming) uses data from individual 
employee personnel records of 700 stores of a nation-wide retail chain, from January 1996 to July 1998 to 
exploit geographic variation in state minimum wages and the employment impact of federal minimum 
wage increases.
3 Consistent with theory linking higher wages to fewer vacancies, she does not find 
evidence for an overall negative employment effect but does find differential employment responses for 
types of workers (teenagers versus adults) and across geographic areas (high- versus low-income areas).   
In short, despite an extensive body of empirical work of increasingly high quality, there is still 
considerable disagreement over the sign and strength of the MW employment effect. Interestingly, this 
was also the state of the debate a half-century ago. In the late 1960s Peterson and Stewart (1969) did a 
major review of thirty years of “pre-regression” MW empirical studies and observed: “there is still no 
consensus as to their employment and other effects” (p. i). Engaged in the debate were institutional 
economists (e.g., Richard Lester 1960) claiming an approximate zero effect and an emerging group of 
neoclassical economists (including Peterson and Stewart) who claimed a negative effect.  
IV. Data and Sample Description 
We use complementary data sets for a sample of 81 Quick-Service restaurants (QSRs) in Georgia 
and Alabama. The primary data used to investigate employment effects comes from restaurants’ 
confidential bi-weekly electronic payroll records on individual employees, collected by the authors for the 
period January 2007 through December 2009. Because the QSR sector has a sizable low-wage workforce 
and neither Georgia nor Alabama has a binding state MW law, these restaurants are good candidates for 
investigating the effects of the three-step federal minimum wage increases. If MW laws have substantive 
negative effects on employment and/or total hours worked, these effects should show up among the most-
affected businesses in our survey. Other channels of adjustment in response to the minimum wage are 
explored qualitatively using our survey of store managers, which in turn is supplemented by data obtained 
from confidential employee surveys and information from semi-structured interviews with store owners 
                                                            
3 Advantages of our data are the presence of information on hours of individual workers and that our businesses are 
franchisor rather than company owned. A national company may respond to a federal MW increase by adjusting its 
cost-sharing formulae with its stores, potentially diluting the differential geographic employment adjustments. 10 
 
and a sample of managers. Below we describe the surveys and provide descriptive data.  
A. Payroll Data 
The restaurants in our sample are part of a national fast-food chain and are operated by three 
franchise owners who agreed to release payroll data for our study under condition of strict 
confidentiality.
4 Although our sample is non-random, we believe it is representative since the products 
offered at fast-food restaurants are uniform and employees’ skill-sets are highly similar. Sampled 
establishments display considerable geographic and city-size variation: 20 restaurants are located in 12 
Eastern Alabama counties close to the Georgia border and the rest are located in 23 Georgia counties 
scattered across Central and Southern Georgia; likewise, some restaurants are in small rural communities 
or along interstate highways while others are in medium-large cities. The spatial differences provide 
variation in the expected impact of the minimum wage across stores and time periods.  
Electronic payroll data provide the following information for each worker for two pay-periods per 
month: restaurant I.D., individual worker I.D., job title (kitchen staff, assistant manager, etc.), regular 
hours worked and regular pay, overtime hours and overtime pay, and total pay.
 The straight-time wage 
rate was reported directly or calculated by dividing regular pay by regular hours. Payroll data for 
managers were not available and they are excluded from our analysis. Fringe benefits for hourly 
employees were close-to-nil (uniforms, meal discounts) and are omitted from what follows. 
We have complete payroll records for all establishments over 72 pay-periods (36 months), 
commencing in January 2007. Six stores enter our sample later (one store opened in May 2007 and one in 
January 2008; four more stores were acquired by the owner in May 2007). None of the stores went out of 
business during the study period. Also provided were data on monthly percentage changes in sales.
5  
Descriptive statistics for payroll records data are presented in Table 1. The sample contains 
approximately 64,000 individual-level observations (24 bi-weekly pay periods each year). The average 
hourly wage for the first year is $6.27, increasing to $6.67 and $7.15 during the latter two years (January-
                                                            
4 We refer to “owners” throughout the paper; however, one of the three was the chief operating officer rather than 
owner. Attempts to gain data from other franchise owners and the national chain were unsuccessful.  
5 We requested data on the monthly level of sales but for confidentiality reasons two owners provided only changes 
in sales. Monthly percent changes in sales are transformed into log points to make them additive over time.  11 
 
to December, with the MW increase July 1).
6 Regular hours worked remain stable across the study period. 
Overtime work declines; the share of employees with overtime decreases from 13% in 2007 to 9% in 
2009 and average overtime falls from 0.74 to 0.45 hours.
7 
Although limited in its geographic focus, the data set used in this study possesses several advantages. 
First, hours and wages are measured at the individual worker level rather than being establishment-level 
averages. These data allow us to construct precise measures of each restaurant’s compliance cost from the 
minimum wage, referred to as GAP, since we know each worker’s wage at the time of the MW increase. 
The use of average restaurant and/or starting salary data from restaurants, as in prior QSR studies, does 
not allow one to calculate an exact measure of compliance cost. Data based on averages also limit the 
ability to explore important aspects of the minimum wage impact, such as wage compression or other 
changes in the wage distribution. A second advantage is the presence of regular and overtime hours 
worked, which are rarely available in other data sets. Finally, payroll data should be highly accurate 
because they are collected for tax-reporting reasons, decreasing concerns about measurement error due to 
imperfect information or poor recall. The payroll data were recorded prior to and independently from our 
survey and thus are not influenced by the research question.  
Payroll data are supplemented with county-level data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW), produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Measures from the QCEW are used 
to control for business and labor market fluctuations at the local level. We extract 2007-2009 data on total 
employment (as well as number of establishments and wages) for all industries and then separately for 
Accommodation and Food Services (NAICS sector 72) and Retail Trade (NAICS 44-45). We also 
compile data at the 3 digit (Food Service and Drinking Places, NAICS 722) and 4-digit (Limited-service 
Eating Places, NAICS 7222) levels. In addition, population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau are 
used to compute annual population density at the county level.  
                                                            
6 None of the stores  utilized the youth or training minimum wage, which sets a lower minimum wage for new 
employees under age 21 for the first 60 to 90 days of employment. 
7 A decline in overtime hours can result from a business downturn or as a response to minimum wages. If average 
hourly earnings and hours are determined jointly in an implicit contract, then a MW manda te raising the straight-
time wage would reduce use of overtime hours in order to (roughly) maintain  average hourly earnings. For theory 
and evidence, see Trejo (1991) and Barkume (2010). 12 
 
B. Manager and Employee Surveys 
In order to examine a broader range of firm behavior, we use data collected from written surveys of 
managers and a survey of employees (not seen by employers). Questionnaires were administered in mid-
July through early-August 2009.
8 The manager survey response rate was 81% (66 of the 81 managers) 
and employee response rate 62%. (1,649 of 2,640 returned and answered at least one question).  
The manager survey was structured as follows. In the first section, managers were asked a series of 
open-ended questions about cost-saving strategies in different areas of business operation, including 
human resource (HR) practices, operational efficiency, non-labor costs, and customer service. The goal 
was to let managers express their own views about the minimum wage increase and document their 
opinions on both positive and negative aspects of the mandate. In the second section, we examine each 
cost-saving technique in more detail. We designed a comprehensive list of possible cost-saving responses 
to the MW increase. The list was partially based on alternative theoretical models but mainly on our face-
to-face discussions with managers and franchisee owners. The goal was to document which internal 
adjustments used by managers might be most effective in mitigating cost increases from the MW.  
A portrait of employee demographics can be seen in Table 2, based on a separate survey given to 
employees. The majority of hourly employees are women and 64% are African-Americans. Relatively 
few workers (8%) are Hispanic. The average age is 28 and only 23% are teenagers. Respondents report 
low family incomes; 38% with annual family income less than $10,000 and an additional 26% with 
income between $10,000 and $20,000. Other worker attributes can be seen in the table.
9 
About 15% of our restaurants (12 of 81) are located in the Atlanta metro area, where wages and cost 
of living are higher than elsewhere. Based on the payroll records, Atlanta-area restaurants have fewer 
employees per establishment, but these employees work longer hours, are more likely to be full time, and 
earn higher wages. For instance, in June 2009 the average hourly wage for workers in the Atlanta sub-
sample is $8.03, compared to $6.94 for hourly employees elsewhere. Atlanta-area employees also display 
                                                            
8 The questionnaires are available from the authors on request.  
9 Although many economists are opposed to raising the minimum wage (e.g., Neumark and Wascher 2008), the 
employees in this sample of restaurants are strongly supportive. The employee survey asked respondents to state if 
they would vote ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to raise the MW from $6.55 (2008) to $7.25 (2009). Nine out of ten marked ‘Yes’. 13 
 
demographic differences (based on the worker survey), being 45% Hispanic and having stronger work 
attachment (49% consider the position “permanent” compared to 31% elsewhere).  
V. Estimation Strategy 
In this section, we describe our measure of the restaurant specific compliance costs of the MW, 
followed by discussion of the estimation strategy for identifying employment and hour responses.  
A. Measuring MW Cost Compliance 
Our identification strategy uses the minimum wage policy change and its effect on the establishment-
level wage bill as a source of exogenous variation. In order to identify the effect of MW increases on 
employment and hours worked, we construct a measure, GAP, of the compliance cost from the mandate. 
Although other studies have used similar measures (Card and Krueger, 1994; Katz and Krueger, 1992; 
Dube et al., 2007; Giuliano, forthcoming), our measure has advantages due to the availability of 
individual-level data on wages and hours worked. 
Specifically, GAPjt is constructed using data from individual worker i at restaurant j at time t (pay 
period). It measures the log change in unit j’s wage bill resulting from a MW increase, assuming 
individual workers’ hours h stay fixed between periods t-1 and t (before and after the minimum wage 
increase). Specifically, the GAP for restaurant j at time t is defined as: 
GAPjt = 1 + [(ΣMWijthijt-1 – ΣWijt-1hijt-1) / ΣWijt-1hijt-1], 
where the bracketed term is summed over workers i for whom Wijt-1 < MWt (i.e., those for whom MWt is 
binding) while set at 0 for workers for whom Wijt-1 ≥ MWt. The numerator in the brackets is the change in 
the wage bill between time periods t-1 and t if hours remain the same, while the denominator is the 
original wage bill. GAP is calculated by simply summing up each employee’s additional earnings (wages 
times hours) required for compliance with the higher MW. That is, GAPjt measures the change in the 
wage bill required for compliance with the MW, holding hours constant. Adding 1 to the bracketed term 
converts the measure from a proportion to a wage ratio (say 1.15 or 15%). We use the natural log of GAP 
(e.g., ln(1.15) = .140) in order to estimate a double log model and employment elasticities with respect to 
the MW GAP. The lnGAP (say .140) is a “proportion” based on an intermediate base between the initial 14 
 
wage and subsequent minimum wage. If restaurant j in period t-1 were paying all employees above the 
new MW effective in period t, then GAP = 1 (and lnGAP = 0).  
Table 3 presents summary statistics for GAP expressed as a percentage (by subtracting 1 and 
multiplying by 100), defined at the establishment-level as an average over March-May of each year prior 
to the July 1 minimum wage increases. The relative cost-impact of the minimum wage grows each year as 
a larger share of workers are affected and require larger increases to reach compliance, from 2.6% of 
payroll as a result of the July 2007 MW, to 4.6% in 2008, and to 6.8% in 2009.  
The gap measure used here differs from those in previous studies. In their seminal paper, Card and 
Krueger (1994) define GAP as a proportional increase in the store’s initial starting wage necessary to 
meet the new mandated rate. According to their definition, GAP reduces to the wage ratio of the new 
minimum wage rate and the wage for a new employee several months before the increase (MWt /Wt-1). 
This variable provides imperfect information on the precise compliance cost since we do not know how 
many workers are impacted by the minimum wage or by how much, nor does one know the work hours 
over which employees will be awarded the higher wage. Rather, Card and Krueger’s “wage gap” is a 
proxy for a relatively high- or low-cost store location. Recognizing such problems, Dube et al. (2007) 
define their measure as a share of workers affected by the city-wide MW increase (their “wage gap” 
variable is called “treatment intensity”). Although they account for the quantity dimension of the MW 
(i.e., the number of workers whose wages are raised), not accounting for the price dimension (i.e., by how 
much wages must be raised for each worker) may generate an imprecise measure of the cost shock from a 
minimum wage mandate. Similarly, using establishment averages of wages and hours would provide a 
noisy measure since workers with wages well above the new MW would effectively “cancel out” affected 
workers (i.e., businesses with equivalent average wages will have different compliance costs). Since our 
GAP measure is based on individual data we are able to capture both quantity (how many workers require 
wage increases) and cost (by how much these workers’ wages must increase).  
B. Regression Model: Identification of MW Employment and Hours Effects 
The empirical analysis of MW impacts on employment and hours uses establishment-level bi-weekly 15 
 
averages, created from the payroll data on individuals. Variable definitions, as well as data sources, are 
provided in Table 4. 
Our empirical strategy relies on the following reduced-form employment equations: 
(1a)  ln(Ejct) = α0+ ψ ln(GAPjct)∙MWt+ α1 ln(GAPjct) + α2MWt + λ∆lnSalesjct-2 + γZct + μc + εjct 
(1b)  ln(hjct)  = α0+ ψ ln(GAPjct)∙MWt+ α1 ln(GAPjct) + α2MWt + λ∆lnSalesjct-2 + γZct + μc + εjct 
where the outcome variable is either ln(Ejct), the log of the average employment in store j, county c, 
during period t (bi-weekly), or the log of aggregate hours hjct, the sum of regular plus overtime hours. 
MWt is the time treatment period set to 1 for the 6 months after each MW increase (i.e., August through 
January in each year).  
The key variable is the interaction term lnGAP∙MW. Its coefficient ψ measures the impact of the cost 
increase from the minimum wage mandate on establishment employment (or hours) averaged over the 
months following the increase. The parameter ψ provides a measure of the employment (hours) elasticity 
with respect to the exogenous required wage change.
10. Based on standard models, competitive theory 
predicts ψ < 0, monopsony ψ >0, and institutionalist/behavioral ψ ≈ 0.  
The regression also includes lnGAPjct, which controls for differences in employment (hours) levels 
between highly- and lowly-impacted restaurants prior to the MW mandate. ∆lnSalesjct-2 is the monthly 
change in log sales, included to capture demand shocks not captured by fixed effects and other controls. It 
is lagged two periods to avoid simultaneity between concurrent employment and sales (results are 
insensitive to use of shorter or longer lags). The sales variable is not an ideal measure of output changes 
since it reflects a mix of prices, product mix, and transactions. The vector Zct includes time-varying 
county-level characteristics reflecting local labor market supply and demand factors; specifically, county-
level population density and total private sector employment minus employment in the Accommodations 
and Food Services and Retail sectors. Vector μc represents state, county, and establishment owner time-
                                                            
10 In the MW literature, estimated teen elasticities with respect to the MW are far smaller than are estimates of labor 
demand elasticities in the larger literature (Hamermesh 1993). This is not surprising given that a small proportion of 
teens are affected by any given MW increase and, even among those affected, compliance costs are low for those 
whose current wage is close to the mandated wage. Our measure of ψ is conceptually closer to a true elasticity, 
being based on employment (hours) changes with respect to the increase in required labor costs. 16 
 
invariant fixed effects. Composite error term εjct = εjt + εct. 
A few econometric issues warrant mention. The error term is likely to be correlated for each 
establishment over time; failure to control for this serial correlation leads to inconsistent standard errors 
(Bertrand et al., 2004). Therefore, all standard errors are clustered on individual restaurants. Possibility of 
heterogeneous trends across counties over time is another potential source of bias. Controlling for time-
varying county-level supply and demand shifters (due to the business cycle) mitigates this concern.  
VI. Findings from Payroll Records 
In this section we report our main findings of the impact of the 2007-2009 federal minimum wage 
increases on employment and hours from restaurant payroll records. Graphical descriptive evidence is 
first presented, followed by estimation results.  
A. Descriptive Evidence 
Cumulative averages across all establishments in our sample would conceal variation due to 
differences in pre-minimum wage levels and the size of GAP (compliance costs). Thus, we group 
establishments with broadly similar anticipated minimum wage impacts. Establishments in the sample are 
divided into three groups – least, middle, and most affected based on the size of GAP in March-May 
2007, prior to the initial July 2007 MW increase. The “least” affected group represents the lowest 25 
percentiles of GAP and includes all zero GAP stores (no compliance costs from the first MW increase). 
The “middle” affected group has GAP values between the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of GAP, while the 
“most” affected group has GAP compliance costs in the 75
th and over percentiles.  
Figure 1 shows plots of bi-weekly establishment-level averages in observed (rather than mandated) 
hourly earnings, employment, average regular hours, and overtime hours for the least, middle, and most 
affected groups of restaurants over the three year period. In panel A, there are three distinct jumps in 
average hourly earnings in July of each year, coinciding with the three MW hikes. The least affected 
group of stores is largely unaffected since the average wage there was slightly above $7 during the whole 
study period. Importantly, there is no evidence of pre-adjustments in hourly wages prior to minimum 
wage increases (confirmed by owners). Small increases around January-February in 2007 and 2008 are 17 
 
attributed to performance-based raises for a portion of the workforce. The final MW increase in July 2009 
has the strongest effect across all three groups.  
Owners confirm that the size and extent of performance based raises were significantly reduced as 
they sought to contain the MW cost impact. Thus, our data show that in the short-run MW cost increases 
are partly offset by slower wage growth for other workers. Evidence from Card and Krueger (1995, p. 
164) and our interviews suggest that in future years part of this compression will be reversed as managers 
hold steady or provide small raises for workers at or close to the minimum, while giving more substantial 
raises to relatively senior workers.
11 In short, we observe that the three federal minimum wage hikes had 
substantial exogenous effects on average hourly earnings and that the intensity of these treatments 
differed substantially across restaurants. Estimates of arguably causal employment and hours effects will 
be based on outcome differences between restaurants with different compliance costs (a varying GAP).  
Panels B-D of Figure 1 show differences in outcomes between the least, middle, and most affected 
restaurant groups. Panel B presents average employment. Despite jumps in the average hourly earnings 
observed in Panel A, we do not observe corresponding reductions in employment that correspond with the 
size of compliance costs. In short, overall patterns appear similar among the three groups. Although we 
can see a small decline in employment after the July 2008 hike, overall employment is stable both within 
and across the three groups of establishments facing varying cost “shocks.” The least affected stores have 
fewer employees on average due to greater use of full-time workers among Atlanta area establishments. 
Some seasonal fluctuations in the average employment are also evident; there are systematic increases in 
employment (and turnover) twice a year (in June-July and December-January), which owners attribute to 
long vacation leaves (some of which show up as turnover in our data) and voluntary turnover. 
Panel C shows average regular hours per worker across the three groups of establishments. Although 
regular hours fluctuate substantially on a pay-period basis (in part because the number of days varies 
                                                            
11 All owners felt conflicted by the desire to give performance increases to maintain morale and keep experienced 
workers, but to limit them to preserve shrinking profit margins. One owner said the profit pinch, along with the low 
probability of turnover in a slack economy, led him to give zero performance increases; another stated “compression 
caught up to us” and reluctantly gave limited performance increases in 2009 even though his labor cost share 
reached an all-time high. Both agreed their internal wage structure would partially-to-completely rebound over time 
if business and profits return to normal.  18 
 
slightly across pay periods), there is no apparent trend in average hours worked over the study period, nor 
are there apparent differences in trend among the three groups.  
Finally, panel D shows the average overtime hours worked. Although the average number of 
overtime hours is very small (one hour on average), there is a significant difference in overtime hours 
among the three groups of establishments. In the two more affected groups, overtime work is practically 
non-existent, while it plays a modest role for the least affected group, where regular bi-weekly hours and 
full-time work are far more substantial. Trends in overtime hours appear similar across store groups. 
Graphical analysis demonstrates that despite substantial differences in the increase in the average 
hourly wage brought about by the Federal minimum wage increases from 2007 to 2009, there are few 
evident differences in changes in employment or hours among restaurants most and least affected by 
wage increases. Were minimum wage shocks producing large employment or hours adjustments, we 
would expect these to be evident from the raw differences between the most and least affected restaurants. 
Smaller effects, however, might be masked by other changes co-varying with the size of MW 
employment effects. Thus, we next explore effects of the MW increases on employment and hours using a 
regression framework that accounts for covariates.  
B. Regression Evidence 
As a first step, we estimate models examining employment in the six months after relative to six 
months before each of the three MW increases, with no differentiation among restaurants based on 
compliance costs (GAP). The change in employment is shown by the coefficients on the treatment 
dummy MW, as seen in Table 5 for each of the three years.  
We first estimate this relationship absent covariates (the left panel of Table 5), which largely mimics 
the earlier visual evidence. There is a small but statistically significant decline in employment of about 3 
percent six months after the second minimum wage increase, but no significant relationship is found for 
the first or third minimum wage hikes. Next we add county, owner, and restaurant fixed effects to 
establish sensitivity of our estimates to these variables. The coefficient on the MW treatment variable is 
robust to the inclusion of store fixed effects (columns 3-6), as well as county and owner fixed effects 19 
 
(columns 7-12). Adding store-fixed effects sharply increases R
2 values, from effectively zero to about .9. 
Notably, the magnitudes of the estimated employment effects are small and imprecise, indicating modest 
employment declines of 1% to 3% following the 2007 and 2008 MW increases and a small increase (1%) 
following the 2009 increase. This exercise demonstrates that time-invariant controls for unobserved 
county, owner and store-level factors are important determinants of the levels of employment in our 
sample, but they do not sweep out the “raw” employment change correlations with the minimum wage. 
In Tables 6A-6C we present our principal results based on a specification that accounts for store-
specific MW compliance costs, as measured by GAP. Estimates of φ, the coefficient on lnGAP∙MW 
(shown in line 1 of Tables 6A-6C), provide estimates of the employment (or hours) treatment effect of the 
minimum wage mandate. Table 6A provides results based on the 2007 MW increase, 6B the 2008 
increase, and 6C the 2009 increase. Our precise measure of MW compliance costs does not change the 
finding in other recent studies that MW employment effects are variable, on average small, and clustered 
around zero. Specifically, there is no statistically significant evidence that stores that experience greater 
MW compliance cost shocks reduce employment relative to restaurants little affected by MW. Estimates 
are positive and insignificant for the 2007 increase, with compliance cost employment elasticities of .14 
to .19 (and .27 for hours). For the 2008 increase, we obtain negative but insignificant elasticity estimates 
of about -.16 to -.28 for employment, but +.16 for hours. The final minimum wage increase in July 2009 
is associated with an apparent gain in employment for stores most affected, estimates of φ being about .45 
for employment and .3 for hours. As mentioned previously, these elasticities are with respect to the 
required compliance costs and should be substantially larger than the teen elasticities commonly 
estimated in the MW literature.  
In results not shown, we compare the Table 6 estimates using our precise GAP measure of dollar 
compliance costs with estimates from identical specifications, except that we replace GAP with a less 
precise treatment variable measuring the share of affected workers, similar to that used in Dube et al. 
(2007). Both the sign and size of the estimated effects are similar for the first and second MW increases. 
For the July 2009 MW increase, we continue to obtain positive estimates, but they are lower in magnitude 20 
 
than estimates shown in Table 6C. The failure to find significant negative employment effects in prior 
studies using a similar methodology does not appear to have resulted because of imprecise measurement 
of compliance costs.  
In further results (not shown), we examine “long-run” MW employment and hours effects based 
solely on information before and after all three MW increases. For each restaurant we include two 
observations, the employment (hours) in January 2007 and in December 2009.
12 The lnGAP measure here 
represents the cumulative GAP (compliance costs) from the three MW increases, while the MW dummy 
is set to 1 for 2009 observations. Measuring the MW effect by the coefficients on lnGAP∙MW, we obtain 
negative (and sometimes large) coefficients, but statistically insignificant in both the employment and 
hours equations. These cumulative estimates are consistent with the evidence seen in Tables 6A-6C. 
Brief mention can be made of the coefficients on control variables in Tables 6A-6C. The change in 
log sales (lagged two periods) has a positive but weak impact on employment. In work not shown, 
principal results are insensitive to the length of the lag on sales (at least one lag is necessary to avoid 
simultaneity between sales and employment growth). Other controls, including private sector employment 
at the country level and population density, are not statistically significant specifications with county 
fixed effects. We also control for lnGAP, as measured in 6A-6C by the initial compliance costs prior to 
the first MW increase (similar results are obtained if we use the year specific compliance costs), and 
include a MW dummy (line 3) to account for differences in employment in the months prior to and 
following the MW increase that are independent of the compliance costs. Neither lnGAP nor MW is 
statistically significant. 
Our finding of an approximately zero MW employment and hours effect supports the 
institutional/behavioral model and seemingly contradicts predictions from both standard competitive (ψ < 
0) and monopsony models (ψ > 0). The fact that our sample spans three years and covers three MW 
increases provides further discriminating insight. The competitive model’s predicted negative 
employment effect might not show up in the span of several months because of adjustment costs and 
                                                            
12 With one observation per restaurant before, and one after, there is no concern about serial correlation in errors. 21 
 
other delays; over a span of three years, however, we would expect negative employment effects to be 
discernible. We cannot rule out the possibility that had our data extended longer, we eventually might see 
employment effects through attrition of stores and capital-labor substitution. The pattern of regression 
coefficients is also at odds with the monopsony model. The model predicts a positive MW employment 
adjustment for the first round (assuming the mandate moves the wage from a sub-competitive level 
toward a competitive level) but thereafter a negative effect should start to emerge as the MW crosses the 
competitive threshold and moves firms up their labor demand schedules. We do not find such a pattern; in 
fact, the most positive (but insignificant) estimates are for the last MW round.  
C. Additional Robustness Checks 
In addition to the specification checks already noted, we report below on additional robustness 
checks. We find little basis for modifying previously shown results. 
Using the GAP variable to measure the impact of the MW on total labor costs is likely to understate 
the wage costs (and overstate estimates of φ) if wages of workers above the minimum are substantially 
affected. This “ripple effect” may reflect managers’ decisions to preserve tenure-wage hierarchy within 
the store. Capturing the ripple effect is challenging because regular performance-based increases occur 
along with MW-induced wage increases and we cannot directly observe what raises would have occurred 
absent the MW. One way to address this issue is to identify workers for whom the MW is non-binding 
prior to each July increase and then examine how their wages change over the course of the year, 
assuming all the increase was due to MW. Including this “ripple” effect in the GAP variable creates an 
upper bound for the estimated total cost-impact of minimum wage on labor cost.
13 A related alternative is 
to examine the change in the total wage bill using actual wage changes but keeping the hours fixed; this 
expanded definition of GAP likewise overstates the policy impact of the MW.  
Using either measure of an expanded GAP including spillovers, we do not see substantial changes in 
estimates of φ or in other coefficients (results not shown). Separately, we find the sizes of estimated 
                                                            
13 The “ripple” effect is defined similarly to the GAP variable: it measures the percent increase in the total wage bill 
due to wage increases only for those employees whose earnings in January through May in a given year are already 
above the upcoming July minimum rate, keeping hours worked fixed. 22 
 
spillovers, while overstated, are smaller than the mandatory compliance costs of the MW. Moreover, the 
two wage effects move differently over time. While the MW compliance costs rise with each year’s 
increase, pay increases for employees above the new minimum weaken.   
Our preferred estimates of MW employment and hour effects included fixed effects for location 
(county) and franchise owner. Exclusion of these controls had little effect on estimates. Nor did exclusion 
from the sample of the Atlanta-area restaurants substantively affect results.
14  
II. Alternative Channels of Adjustment 
The finding of generally small and insignificant impacts of the minimum wage on employment and 
hours in this study (and others) challenges the predictions of the competitive and monopsony models – at 
least if considered in relatively standard form. But if employment and hours do not adjust to absorb the 
cost increase, then what does? We address this question by exploring a wide range of additional channels 
of adjustment. Evidence is obtained primarily from manager surveys but also the payroll data, 
establishment owners’ records, and interviews. Some of these CoA have received attention in earlier MW 
studies; others are largely undocumented.  
A. Costs and Prices 
The competitive and institutional models predict an increase in the output price in response to a 
binding minimum wage while the monopsony model predicts a decrease in price. As reported previously, 
using the payroll data we calculate that the direct MW-induced increase in compliance costs (i.e. raising 
wages below MW just to the minimum, absent any other pay increases) was 2.6%, 4.6%, and 6.8% for the 
three years. We add to this the estimated increase in employer payroll taxes (OASDI-HI plus federal and 
state UI, or about 13% of payroll).
15 If there were constant returns-to-scale in production and full pass 
                                                            
14 One other robustness check requires mention. In March, 2008, the corporate office of this chain issued a 
requirement for all franchised restaurants to stay open for an additional hour Sunday through Wednesday and for an 
additional two to three hours Thursday through Saturday. After negotiation with the franchise owners, in August the 
mandate for Thursday night was removed and twenty-nine stores were exempted from most other requirements. 
Regression analysis (not shown) distinguishing between exempt and non-exempt stores leaves our reported results 
unaffected. It is worth noting that the 2008 MW increase is the only one of the three years for which we obtain 
negative (but insignificant) estimates of MW employment effects. The mandate helps explain the negative 
employment effects seen in Table 5 across all restaurants, but need not bias coefficients in Table 6B based on 
differences in compliance costs. 
15 Owners emphasized that discussions about MW mostly ignore the compliance costs from higher payroll taxes.  23 
 
through, the increase in price due to higher wages should be proportional to the share of labor in total 
factor cost. We do not have a direct measure of labor’s share of costs, but use a guesstimate of 24% based 
on data from one of the franchise owners showing that non-managerial payroll was 18% to 20% of total 
sales.
16 Taking each year’s MW compliance costs (inclusive of payroll taxes) and labor’s share, the 
cumulative three-year increase in total costs due directly to MW compliance is an estimated 3.9%.  
If MW compliance was the only increase in costs over three years, it might be readily handled 
through price and non-price channels of adjustments. However, restaurants faced other sources of labor 
costs, including performance increases and MW spillovers, and large changes in non-labor costs.  
We calculate an extended measure of labor costs for our restaurants taking into account wage 
increases to MW workers beyond the new minimum, spillovers to above-MW workers, plus any 
performance increases. We do this by examining the total increase in the wage bill (holding constant 
hours) over the three year period, including estimated payroll tax increases. A cumulative 25.0% increase 
in total labor costs boosted total costs (labor plus non-labor) by an estimated 5.7%  
Although important, increases in wages were not the principal source of cost increases during this 
period. For the approximately 76% share of costs due to non-labor inputs and managers’ compensation, 
we assume that these rose at the same rate as the BLS Producer Price Index for “finished consumer foods” 
during 2007-2009. On a percentage basis, these costs increased roughly half as fast as did labor costs, but 
they had a larger impact on total costs given their larger share. Taking the weighted average of the labor 
and non-labor costs, we calculate that average per unit costs rose 15.4% during the three-year period.
17 
To what extent were restaurant owners able to offset these higher labor and non-labor costs through 
increases in menu prices? We cannot measure price changes precisely, but did obtain price hikes from the 
business owners for the most popular menu item (homogeneous among the stores), a combo meal made 
up of a sandwich, small fries, and a drink. The price increase for this item over the three years, averaged 
                                                            
16 Labor’s share of total costs should exceed its share of sales. Our estimate of the price pass-through needed to 
offset cost increases is insensitive to the assumed labor’s share once we account for non-labor cost.  
17 Franchised stores buy all food and related supplies from corporate-designated wholesalers. An owner provided us 
with data on the annual percentage price change for a typical food supply “basket.” This yields a cost estimate 
highly similar to that using the PPI. Whereas MW compliance costs were low in 2007 but climbed in 2008 and 
2009, non-labor costs exhibited the opposite pattern (many input prices fell in the 2008-2009 recession), making it 
easier (ceteris paribus) for stores to handle the 2009 MW hike.  24 
 
across all restaurants (each given an equal weight) was 10.9%. Although less than the estimated 15.4% 
increase necessary for full pass through, a ballpark estimate is that about 2/3 of total cost increases were 
offset by higher prices. Had the MW been the only source of cost increase, it seems likely that most-to-all 
could have been passed through to consumers.  
For this sample of QSRs, higher prices rather than cuts in employment and hours seems to be the 
most important CoA for higher MW cost. We also find evidence, however, of second-order but non-trivial 
adjustments through a variety of other channels. 
B. Internal Wage Structure 
Increases in the minimum wage may be partially offset by awarding smaller-than-normal (or zero) 
pay raises to workers with wages above the minimum, leading to internal wage compression. 
Alternatively, managers may choose to preserve the wage hierarchy. Our data reveal the former. When we 
compare the size of the average wage increases among workers for whom the MW was and was not 
binding, we find that workers at the high end of the wage distribution receive smaller absolute (and 
relative) pay increases. Hence, the MW raised the mean of the internal pay distribution but reduced 
dispersion. Figure 2 shows changes in wage distributions between low and high-wage workers, before 
(March-May) and after (August-December).
18 Wage distributions shift significantly to the right for low-
wage workers, with a high frequency of workers receiving the minimum. For higher-wage workers, the 
distribution barely shifts; thus, over the three MW rounds the higher-paid, more senior workers 
experienced a relative decline in pay position. Dube et al. (2007) report a similar finding. Managers 
reported that their more senior/experienced workers were typically the most reliable and high-performing 
and the threat of turnover and poor morale placed limits on the degree of compression. As earlier 
indicated (footnote 11), owners expected – given macroeconomic improvement and absence of further 
MW increases -- to gradually reverse this compression in future years by giving more senior workers 
catch-up increases. 
                                                            
18 For the period before each MW increase, we wanted months as close as possible to July 1, but excluded June in 
case MW wage hikes occurred prior to July. For the post-MW period, we excluded July to provide time for 
restaurant compliance and measured wages through the end of the year to allow sufficient time for spillovers.  25 
 
C. Turnover 
Labor turnover at all ranks is costly to firms. If higher pay rates reduce labor turnover and vacancies, 
firms can partially offset MW costs by savings in hiring, training, and separation. Higher wages, per the 
dynamic monopsony model, may also reduce vacancies and lead to a higher level of employment and 
hours. Empirical evidence on the MW/job attachment link is limited, but generally finds lower turnover 
resulting from the MW (e.g., Dube et al., 2007; Reich et al., 2005; and Fairris and Reich, 2005 for living 
wage ordinances).  
A common way to examine turnover is to apply duration analysis, although our data structure limits 
what we can do.
19 The completed length of employment is unobserved; we do not observe entry except 
for recent employees and do not observe exit for those who continue beyond December 2009. Left 
censoring is addressed by considering only “new hires” — workers who enter the sample after mid-
January 2007 (i.e., after the first pay period). Using this definition, we observe a high turnover rate, as is 
common in the fast-food sector: the median “survival” in the sample is 14 weeks (7 pay periods) and 
roughly 70% of all new hires are not in the sample by the end of December 2009. In addition, we find that 
low- and high-wage establishments do not have any significant difference in survival spells, suggesting 
that wage differentials across stores reflect local labor market conditions. 
Alternatively, we can evaluate employee turnover by measuring payroll attrition rates, the share of 
the total workforce observed in pay period t but not observed in period t+1. By this measure, if all 
workers are present in two consecutive pay-periods (not counting new hires), the turnover rate is zero. 
Figure 3 plots the average shares of workers missing from consecutive payrolls for the entire study 
period. Turnover defined by this measure is high—approximately 8%—but there is a downward trend, 
particularly pronounced after the second MW increase in July 2008.
20 Over the entire three year period, 
turnover (attrition) rates fell from roughly 10% to 5%. Rates are not stable across months, with spikes in 
summer and in December-January. 
                                                            
19 The “failure event” in our case is falling out of the sample. If a worker is not observed for two or more months 
and then returns to work, the payroll records count the person as two distinct workers.  
20 Data from the BLS’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) show that quit rates in “Accommodation 
and Food Services” are the highest among any of the very broad industries for which they publish results.  26 
 
The causal relationship between MW and the decline in turnover is difficult to isolate because our 
sample period includes peak and trough of a business cycle. The raw data show little downward trend in 
turnover until the second half of 2008 when the economy seriously slumped. In results not shown, we 
examined the relationship between store-level probability of attrition and the compliance cost of the MW. 
We used specifications that mimicked those seen in Tables 6A-6C, but with restaurant turnover (attrition) 
as the dependent variable. As expected, restaurants with low wage levels have significantly higher levels 
of turnover than do higher wage restaurants (as reflected in a positive coefficient on lnGAP). Based on 
coefficients on lnGAP∙MW, which measures how turnover varies with MW compliance costs, we did not 
find significant turnover effects following the 2007 and 2009 increases, but did find a significant decline 
in turnover following the 2008 increase. 
Whatever the impact of the MW on turnover, it is clear from the manager survey that store managers 
regard it as important. When asked to comment in an open-ended question about the most positive aspect 
of the higher MW, managers emphasized lower turnover, along with higher morale, greater worker effort, 
and more and better job applicants. Two of the franchise owners estimated turnover cost at $300-$400 per 
employee – factoring in approximately 40 hours of non-revenue producing training over six months. An 
owner said on turnover, “We hate to go outside.” Although we find a weak and sometimes zero statistical 
relationship between the MW and turnover rates, some portion of the MW cost effect is arguably offset by 
reduced training, hiring, and separation costs (Arrowsmith et al. 2003).  
D. Operational and Human Resource Efficiencies 
We next explore the importance of operational and human resource (HR) efficiencies with data 
collected from the manager surveys and interviews. Although these data do not permit formal analysis, 
insights are provided on the “black box” of internal operations generally absent in the MW literature.  
As indicated earlier, managers were asked to estimate how much of the MW labor cost increase they 
could offset by implementing various operational efficiencies. The responses averaged 23%. Although 
conjectural and perhaps subject to upward bias (from over-optimism, etc.), this estimate has some 
reliability because the managers (1) had already worked-out as part of their business plans the likely 27 
 
increase in the MW wage bill (the ratio’s denominator) and (2) had two rounds of experience with 
operational belt-tightening from the 2007 and 2008 MW increases from which to project an estimate for 
2009 (the numerator). The survey question was designed so cost-savings from projected price increases 
and employment/hours changes were explicitly excluded. 
We next sought to identify the specific sources of cost savings. Based on input from manager 
interviews and several pre-tests of the survey instrument, we developed a list of 23 potential CoA in the 
following areas: human resource practices; operational efficiency and productivity; non-labor costs; and 
customer service. Despite careful wording, some items inevitably have a degree of overlap.  
Managers were asked whether they currently use or plan to use in the next three months each of these 
23 cost-saving measures in order to offset MW cost. Those who answered yes then rated its contribution to 
cost savings on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 the most cost-effective. Of the total 81 stores, 66 managers 
responded to the survey, all of whom answered the yes/no question. Among those who answered yes, all 
but a small number provided ratings on importance.  In the text below, we state the proportion of the 
managers who answered yes. Figures 4A-4C provide the distribution of answers among those who rated 
its importance. We collapse the five categories into three (ratings 1-2, 3, and 4-5), labeling them “not very 
important,” “somewhat important,” and “very important.”  
We start first with efficiencies in HR practices. We identified several such channels. Most of the 66 
managers (90%) planned to increase performance standards and, as seen in Figure 4A, among those who 
provide ratings on its cost savings about two-thirds rank it as “very important.” Higher performance 
standards include things such as requiring a better attendance and on-time record, faster and more 
proficient performance of job duties, taking on additional tasks, and faster termination of poor-
performers. Managers said in interviews that part of effective HR practice is to directly communicate to 
employees the quid pro quo of higher performance for higher wages. Another cost-saving measure is 
adjusting employee work schedules to more tightly match beginning and ending times with customer 
demand, thus gaining a fuller utilization of each employee hour. Regarding labor-labor substitution, most 
managers did not consider changing the part-time/full-time mix; they did express interest in hiring more 28 
 
experienced and older workers but fewer teenagers. Only 10% of the managers planned to reduce 
training, contra the hypothesis of the competitive model. The reason given in interviews is that greater 
operational efficiency requires greater worker training (the two are complements). Consistent with 
evidence from the payroll data, a number of managers (40%) state they would delay or limit pay 
raises/bonuses for more experienced employees.  
The manager surveys are consistent with the evidence from payroll records that reducing 
employment is not a principal CoA. Only 23% of managers planned to decrease their workforce to offset 
the higher cost and only 12% rated this strategy as “somewhat” or “very important” for cost saving. A 
significantly greater proportion (60%) planned to reduce work hours, although judged from the written 
responses this seems to substantially overlap with the question on change in work schedules. An example 
cited is letting a person on the night crew leave at 11:00 instead of midnight.  
We probed in interviews for the reasons behind the small-to-zero employment effect and several 
factors were cited: speedy customer service is a “must-do” and reduced staffing threatens it; the 
production process features indivisibilities that preclude marginal labor adjustments (a half-person cannot 
run a cash register); and team spirit and a cooperative employee attitude are the most important factors for 
successful operations and lay-offs or cuts in hours undermine these.
21 With regard to the labor input, it 
appears effort is the short-run continuous adjustment variable in the production function and employment 
is at least partially discontinuous.  
We next transition to various forms of operating efficiencies. The owners keep detailed records on 
daily and weekly indicators of costs, sales, and payroll and establish targets that managers are expected to 
meet. A rise in the MW (or other exogenous cost) moves the stores past these targets and owners place 
pressure on managers to squeeze out some of the added cost through tighter operations. With regard to the 
MW increase, the number one response was to gain more productivity out of the workforce, such as from 
cross-training, multi-tasking, and tighter work schedules. As indicated in Figure 4B, boosting morale was 
also a major CoA (cited by 92%). Managers said one important way to work on this margin is to cast the 
                                                            
21 One owner predicted to us in the first interview (before data analysis) that we would find a zero employment 
effect, citing reasons such as those just given.   29 
 
MW cost shock as a “challenge to the store” and use it to energize employees to improve productivity for 
the sake of the “team.” The managers deliberately worked to create interdependent utility functions 
among their crew to create productive synergies, team spirit, and self-enforcement of high work norms 
through enhanced peer monitoring. The opposite side of this coin, we were told, is that the greater 
emphasis on team production makes it crucial to treat employees not as disposable “hired hands” but as 
valued crew members who managers strive to respect, support, and treat fairly. This is one reason why 
managers try to avoid overt cuts in hours and headcount; an exception being use of the MW increase as an 
opportunity to weed out particularly low-performing employees.   
Another potential CoA in the operations and productivity area is new capital equipment. We did not 
include this option on the manager survey because owners make the capital investment decision. Owners 
indicated a steady if slow process of capital-labor substitution, constrained in the short run by cash-flow 
constraints and the relatively simple nature of the technology of fast-food production.  
We described earlier that there is both a neoclassical and institutional/behavioral perspective on 
managerial “tightening-up.” In the competitive and monopsony models, firms are assumed to 
continuously minimize cost so no slack (underutilized resources) exists. Owners and managers told us 
that since fast-food is highly competitive they vigilantly monitor costs and after two previous MW 
increases felt like they had pretty well squeezed out the “fat.” Yet when questioned on planned 
adjustments to the third MW hike they cited a number of actions to further improve efficiency.  
Three observations from the interviews are apropos. The first is that the managers are typically 
overloaded with daily operation issues and work long weekly hours (often 50-55) and, hence, cannot 
devote the time to actively address important but longer-run or secondary operational issues. A MW hike 
thus acts as a catalyst or shock that forces managers to step out of the daily routine and think about where 
extra savings can occur. Second, as a practical matter it is difficult to distinguish such adjustments as a 
neoclassical-like movement along an isoquant (substituting a given stock of managerial time from one 
activity to another) versus an institutional/behavior movement to a higher isoquant (generating more 
output from given managerial inputs by energizing effort/attention to unexploited areas of cost-saving). 30 
 
Third, owners said the “quality” of the manager is the single most important determinant of unit success 
(given location, etc.) and managerial quality is scarce and heterogeneous. What is typically referred to as 
“slack” in part reflects differences in managerial quality, along with other unmeasured factors that 
account for productivity differences across establishments (Syverson 2011). All in all, we feel unable to 
disentangle these two competing hypotheses.  
E. Non-labor Costs and Customer Service 
Two other distinct CoA are savings on non-labor inputs and customer service improvements. Interviews 
indicated that utility costs, insurance, food costs, food wastage, size of drinks, and condiment supply all 
received attention. The survey responses (Figure 4C) indicate an overwhelming majority of managers plan to 
economize on electricity and water usage and reduce food waste (e.g., by more careful scheduling of 
deliveries and tighter inventory control). One area of focus was cost control at the condiment bar.
22  
Another CoA is aimed at increasing sales through improved service. Part of raising performance 
standards is more “smiling faces” at the counter and drive-in window; another element of customer 
service is having an employee check more often that bathrooms, dining tables, and parking lots are clean. 
Marketing strategies, such as meal discounts, new menu items, and raffles are implemented to maintain or 
increase volume. A number of the managers interviewed said they also planned to offset higher cost by 
building volume with more special events, for example birthday parties and events for local churches, 
youth groups, sports teams, and retirement homes.  
F. Profit 
The final CoA is profit. In effect, profit is the residual CoA that results from the movement in all the 
other revenue and cost channels earlier discussed. It is crucial, however, as profit – and profit potential – 
are fundamental to maintaining and growing companies and their base of jobs and hours. 
Prior evidence on the profit effect of MW is scarce; several studies, however, find zero or small 
negative effects (Card and Krueger 1995; Draca, Machin and Van Reenan 2011). Due to confidentiality 
                                                            
22 Previously, customers received their food at the counter and then went to the condiment bar, where they could 
take as much ketchup, sugar, and other supplies as desired. A plan in progress at the time of our interviews was to 
keep the condiment bar, but first ask customers at the counter how many packets of ketchup (etc.) they wanted and 
include these with the order in the hope the net effect would provide a reduction in cost. 31 
 
concerns, none of the owners for this study would share data on annual profit. We did obtain, however, 
data on profit change for approximately three-fourths of the stores spanning the three MW increases. 
Unfortunately, the profit data cover a fiscal year (e.g., starting October 1) so disentangling the MW effect 
is difficult; hence, for this and other reasons our evidence is best considered suggestive.  
Annual profit change at these stores averaged 6.9% (FY 2006), 20.0% (FY 2007), 5.9% (FY 2008), 
0.5% (FY 2009), and -20.0% (FY 2010). Thus, FY 2007 includes only 3 months of the July 1, 2007 MW 
increase, while FY 2010 begins 3 months following the July 1, 2009 increase and reflects the wage base 
following the three MW increases, along with all other cost changes. 
We earlier showed that the “bite” of the MW on store labor cost increased over the three rounds; 
these data show that profit growth correspondingly slowed in each round from FY 2007 through FY 2010. 
For each MW hike, the businesses were able to keep revenue ahead of costs (profits grew each year 
through FY 2009) through various CoA, but their ability to do so diminished over time.  
Owners indicated in interviews that if the only cost increases over 2007-2009 were from the MW 
they could have mostly-to-completely offset it through savings in other CoA. Profit growth declined over 
this period, however, as increases in labor cost were compounded by increases in other cost areas (e.g., 
rising food and operating costs) and a substantial slowdown in sales starting in 2008 due to the global 
economic crisis. FY 2010 was, in the words of one owner, a “perfect storm” for profit (-20%) since the 
base of labor cost rose the most in 2009, commodity prices spurted upward in 2010, and local economy 
activity and restaurant sales remained anemic. It is impossible for us to decompose the weight due to each 
factor, but the owners agreed in interviews that the decline in sales volume much dominated the MW as a 
contributor to lower profit growth (roughly estimated as 10-to-1).  
The conclusion we draw from our sample and time period is that (1) the MW by itself has a negligible 
to small effect on profits, employment, and growth but (2) these companies are struggling with multiple 
sources of cost increase in a climate of significantly deteriorated sales and, hence (3) the three factors 32 
 
together have posed growing profit and (in some cases) survival problems, with potentially negative 
consequences for additional business formation and employment growth in the medium-to-long run.
23 
VIII. Summary and Conclusion 
Since empirical study of the minimum wage has a near century-long history, one must question 
whether an additional study breaks new ground. We believe this study does so along several dimensions. 
First, our data set is innovative. It captures three rounds of MW increases, contains accurately 
measured establishment-level pay and employment data, supplements it with data from manager surveys on 
a wide-range of rarely-captured aspects of internal firm operations, and is rounded out with information 
from field-level interviews. Although shortcomings are present – for example, a modest sample size of 
restaurants, the qualitative and subjective nature of the manager data, and anecdotal reports from personal 
interviews, on balance we believe the data set makes possible better-measured answers to some old 
questions and rarely-measured answers to new or under-explored questions. 
Second, we recast analysis of the minimum wage into a broad “channels of adjustment” framework, 
moving well beyond the conventional emphasis on employment/hours effects. The effect of MW on the 
internal operation of firms, in particular, has been left as a mostly unexamined black box (but see 
Arrowsmith et al. 2003). We believe the CoA framework usefully focuses attention on the many margins 
potentially affected by MW and the various economic agents who bear the cost.  
Third, the employment effect of MW has been a point of controversy for decades. Our analysis 
identifies the employment and hours effects based on differences across restaurants and over time in the 
compliance costs resulting from the three MW mandates. We find, in line with other recent studies, that 
the measured employment impact is variable across establishments, but overall not statistically 
distinguishable from zero. The same absence of a significant negative effect is found for employee hours, 
even when examined over a three-year period.  
Fourth, our study finds evidence that the cost of MW is passed along and absorbed through a wide-
range of CoA. The quantitatively most important is increases in product price to consumers. Other CoA 
                                                            
23 The owner with the largest number of stores indicated in 2010 that for the first time in the company’s history (40+ 
years) no new units were planned or under construction. 33 
 
include operational “tightening-up,” higher employee performance standards and work effort, new 
marketing programs to expand sales, and compression of the internal wage structure. Interview evidence 
suggests that in good economic times restaurants can mostly and perhaps completely maintain profit 
margins by utilizing the other CoA, but in economic hard times these are insufficient and a higher MW 
takes a bite out of profit, particularly at marginal/low-volume stores. 
Fifth, this study offers a new explanation for the small and insignificant MW employment effects 
found in the literature. Some argue that such estimates are a statistical artifact from data mismeasurement 
or flawed procedures, while others appeal to structural or dynamic forms of monopsony in labor markets. 
Our study suggests an additional three-part explanation. The first – empirically important for the firms in 
this study but not a factor much noted in the MW literature – is that even large increases in the MW may 
be modest as compared to other cost increases that business owners must routinely offset or absorb, thus 
leading to a lower MW elasticity (per the Marshall-Hicks condition on the size of labor’s cost share). The 
second is that a MW cost increase flows through more adjustment channels than economists have 
typically considered. And the third is that managers regard employment and hours cuts as a relatively 
costly and perhaps counter-productive option, regarding them as a last-resort. A zero (or very small) 
employment effect, from this perspective, is compatible with economic theory as long as the theory posits 
multiple CoA with differential costs.  
Sixth, our study has sought to identify alternative CoA in three labor market models – competitive, 
monopsony, and institutional/behavioral – and evaluate which model’s predictions best align with 
empirical findings. This comparison is challenging because the models come in different versions; after 
extensions and qualifications they start to shade into one another; and in some cases the models yield 
similar CoA predictions. Our first-line judgments are (1) all three models capture important elements of 
truth regarding the MW and particular CoA and (2) the different permutations of each model and 
limitations of data constrain ability to differentiate among them. Given this caveat, we find that certain 
predicted effects of both the standard competitive and monopsony models are not supported by observed 
CoA in this study. Examples include employment and hours (both), training (competitive), and prices 34 
 
(monopsony). The evidence is ambiguous in other areas, such as managerial “tightening-up” and changes 
in the internal wage structure. Judged as a whole, the CoA evidence tends to best cluster around the 
institutional/behavioral model and, in particular, its emphasis on human-related adjustments and internal 
operations. However, this conclusion has to be duly qualified with recognition that the institutional model 
is also least formalized and tightly specified, giving it perhaps greater facility to “fit the data.” 
Nonetheless, we conclude that Richard Lester – neo-institutional labor economist of the 1950s and 
strongest proponent of a zero MW employment effect – may in hindsight have had more of the story right 
than neoclassical price theorists were for many years willing to consider.  
Although the short- to medium-run employment effects predicted by the competitive model do not 
show up in our data, we suspect that the competitive model provides guidance for the longer run. To the 
extent that impacted businesses cannot fully offset or pass through MW cost increases, as was the case 
following the third year (2009) MW increase, there remains the question of business survival, expansion 
of existing franchises, and entry over time. We do not observe establishments in our sample beyond the 
third year or observe how the MW affects entry; thus, we cannot rule out negative employment effects 
over the long run. Recent work on establishment level productivity (Syverson 2011) shows large 
differences in productivity even within narrowly defined markets and finds that long run survival is 
strongly related to productivity. It would not be surprising, therefore, if a higher MW led to the gradual 
demise of the least-efficient/profitable segment of establishments in an industry.  
Seventh, and finally, while our study has not sought to make a welfare case for or against the 
minimum wage, it does offer useful insights. A competitive model with few CoA yields a relatively 
negative verdict on the efficiency effects of a MW while an imperfect/behavioral market model with 
numerous internal CoA is likely to yield a less negative or even positive assessment. Getting the model 
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Figure 1. Average hourly earnings, employment and hours, January 2007 – December 2009 
 
 
Notes: Shown are establishment averages for hourly earnings, employment, regular hours and overtime hours 
for three groups of stores by pay-period (bi-monthly). “Least” affected stores include those where GAP is in 
the bottom 25 percentiles, ”Middle” the 25
th–75
th percentiles, and “Most” percentiles 75 and over. The zigzag 
pattern of hours is due in part to variability in the number of days in bi-monthly payroll periods. Vertical lines 
mark the MW increases; horizontal lines in Panel A show the MW mandates. 
























































Figure 2. Distribution of hourly earnings: High and low-wage workers before (March-May)  
and after (August-December) the 2007, 2008, and 2009 minimum wage increases 
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Figure 3. Average turnover of workforce, January, 2007-December, 2009
 
Figure 4A. Reaction to higher labor cost due to MW increase:  
Human resource practices and cost-savings
 














Turnover: share of workers not on payroll (relative to the last payroll)
4  3  3 
6 
2  3  2  3  2  2 
14  13  13  14 
4 
11 




15  15 
11  11 

















Figure 4B. Reaction to higher labor cost due to MW increase:  
Operational efficiency and productivity 
 
 
Figure 4C. Reaction to higher labor cost due to MW increase: 
Non-labor expenses/customer services and cost-savings 
 
Notes: Figures 4A-C show distribution of answers to Question 7 in the Manager Survey. Each manager was asked the 
following question: “Other research studies of the minimum wage have identified the following list of items as 
BUSINESS ADJUSTMENTS you might possible make in order to OFFSET the payroll cost increase associated with the 
higher minimum wage. Which of the following are you planning to do in the next 1-3 months OR have done already in 
the last month (please check YES or NO)? If your answer is YES, please rate the impact of your action for cost-saving on 
the scale 1 to 5 (1=least important; 5=very important). Please circle one number from 1 to 5.”  The responses were 
collapsed as follows: “Not very important” if a respondent answered 1 or 2; “Somewhat” if 3; and “Very important” if 4 
or 5. Shown are responses for those who answered YES to the “planning to do or have done” question. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Individual-level payroll records 
 





  Hourly wage rate  63,164  6.28  0.95 
Regular hours  63,716  49.18  22.58 
Overtime work (dummy)  63,718  0.12  0.33 
Overtime hours  63,716  0.74  3.38 
 
 





  Hourly wage rate  64,764  6.68  0.84 
Regular hours  65,291  49.27  22.30 
Overtime work (dummy)  65,290  0.10  0.30 
Overtime hours  65,290  0.63  3.15 
 





  Hourly wage rate  63,484  7.15  0.69 
Regular hours  63,972  49.18  21.67 
Overtime work (dummy)  63,975  0.07  0.25 
Overtime hours  63,972  0.45  2.76 
 
 
Table 2. Employee descriptive characteristics from the employee surveys 
Variable  N   Mean  St. dev. 
       
Gender  (female=1)  1,649  0.657  0.475 
Race       
White  1,595  0.207  0.405 
Hispanic  1,595  0.082  0.275 
Black  1,595  0.644  0.479 
Asian  1,595  0.053  0.225 
Other  1,595  0.014  0.117 
Marital status       
Single  1,451  0.686  0.464 
Married  1,451  0.175  0.38 
Divorced/widowed  1,451  0.054  0.226 
Living with partner  1,451  0.085  0.28 
No. of children under 18  1,625  0.958  1.3 
Age  1,628  28.194  10.719 
School in Fall (=1)  1,623  0.34  0.474 
Level of schooling       
Some high school  1,611  0.273  0.446 
High school grad/GED  1,611  0.475  0.5 
Some college  1,611  0.220  0.414 
College graduate  1,611  0.032  0.175 
Health insurance (=1)  1,618  0.406  0.491 
Country of origin       
U.S.  1,551  0.917  0.276 
Mexico  1,551  0.050  0.219 




Table 2 (continued). Employee descriptive characteristics from the employee surveys 
Variable  N   Mean  St. dev. 
       
Wage in June 2009  1,555  6.987  1.416 
Average hours per week  1,568  29.510  8.309 
Tenure at store (in months)  1,571  26.812  39.992 
No other  jobs  1,592  0.832  0.374 
Total annual family income       
Less than 10,000  1,541  0.382  0.486 
10-20,000  1,541  0.263  0.44 
20-50,000  1,541  0.276  0.283 
>50,000  1,541  0.079  0.115 




Table 3. MW compliance cost (mean GAP) as a percentage of payroll 
Year  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max 
2007  2.598  2.083  0  8.150 
2008  4.640  2.628  0  9.157 
2009  6.805  2.638  0.115  10.639 
Means are calculated for the same 81 restaurants each year. See text for description of 
GAP. The total increases in payroll, holding hours constant and inclusive of the GAP, 
were 6.0%, 6.6%, and 7.9% following the 2007, 2008, and 2009 MW increases. 
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Definition  Source 
     
Employment  Total number of workers with positive hours, in logs  author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
Hours  Total number of hours worked, regular plus overtime, in logs   author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
lnGAP  Percentage increase in the store's wage bill, holding hours 
constant, resulting from increasing wage of workers up to the 
new MW for workers whose wage in March-May, averaged 
for each store in March-May of each year. This captures 
increases intended to comply with the MW that occur prior to 
July 1. As defined in text, GAPjt = 1 + [(Σhijt-1MWijt – Σhijt-
1Wijt-1) / Σhijt-1Wjt-1], summed over workers i for whom Wijt1 < 
MWt and set to 0 for workers for whom Wijt1  ≥ MWt  
author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
MWt  Binary variable equal to 1 in August, 2007-January, 2008; 
August, 2008-Janry, 2009; and August, 2009-December, 
2009, respectively 
author calculation; electronic 
payroll records 
GA  Binary variable equal to 1 if establishment is in Georgia   
∆lnSales  Change in log of monthly sales, lagged periods, calculated 
from bi-monthly information on percentage sales growth 
Restaurant owners 
confidential files 
Pop Density  County-level population density; persons per square mile  Census Bureau population 
estimates; available from 
http://www.census.gov/popest/
counties/counties.html 
ln Priv Emp   County-level number of employees in private establishments, 
minus employment in Accommodations and Food Services 
and Retail (NAICS 722) and Retail (NAICS 44-45) sectors 
BLS, Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages 
(QCEW); available from 
http://www.bls.gov/cew/home.
htm 
County FE  County fixed effects; binary variable equal to 1 if a restaurant 
is located in a given county 
author calculation based on 
GSP mapping of store 
locations 
Owner FE  Owner fixed effects; binary variable equal to 1 if a restaurant 
belongs to one of the three franchise owners 




Table 5. Employment level changes during MW increase periods, with and without  
county, owner and store fixed effects  
  Jan’07-  Jan’08-  Jan’09-  Jan’07-  Jan’08-  Jan’09-  Jan’07-  Jan’08-  Jan’09-  Jan’07-  Jan’08-  Jan’09- 
  Jan’08  Jan’09  Dec’09  Jan’08  Jan’09  Dec’09  Jan’08  Jan’09  Dec’09  Jan’08  Jan’09  Dec’09 
MW  -0.018  -0.032*  0.006  -0.007  -0.033*  0.006  -0.006  -0.033*  0.006  -0.006  -0.033*  0.006 
  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Store FE  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  No 
County FE  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Owner FE  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                         
Obs.  2,029  2,104  1,940  2,029  2,104  1,940  2,029  2,104  1,940  2,029  2,104  1,940 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.88  0.91  0.94  0.74  0.79  0.82  0.74  0.79  0.82 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered on establishment. The dependent variable is store-level log of bi-weekly employment. 
MW is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the six (or five) months following the July MW increase; that is, August 2007-January 2008, 




Table 6A. Pooled OLS, reduced-form model for employment and aggregate hours,  
1
st MW increase: January 2007 - January 2008 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnHours 
lnGAP1∙MW1  0.194  0.193  0.139  0.265 
  (0.503)  (0.502)  (0.490)  (0.334) 
lnGAP  1.888  1.889  1.918  0.225 
  (1.993)  (1.995)  (1.992)  (1.489) 
MW1  -0.018  -0.018  -0.016  -0.012 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.012) 
∆ lnSales   0.023  0.024  0.018  0.187* 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.052) 
         
County FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Owner FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,685  1,685  1,685  1,843 
R-squared  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.64 
Notes. Column 2 adds lnPrivEmp to (1). Column 3 adds PopDensity to (1). Robust standard errors clustered 
on establishments are in parentheses. MW1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August 2007 - January 2008. 
Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in 
the last column is the log of total hours (regular + overtime) hours. In line 2, lnGAP is the initial lnGAP1 
prior to the first MW increase. ∆lnSales is lagged two periods. * designates significance at the .05 level. 
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Table 6B. Pooled OLS, determinants of employment and aggregate hours,  
2
nd MW increase: January 2008 - January 2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnHours 
lnGAP2∙MW2  -0.202  -0.155  -0.280  0.159 
  (0.405)  (0.405)  (0.400)  (0.210) 
lnGAP  0.123  0.110  0.143  -1.176 
  (1.978)  (1.981)  (1.976)  (1.203) 
MW2  -0.017  -0.015  -0.011  -0.042* 
  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.010) 
∆ lnSales   0.124*  0.118*  0.111*  0.125* 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.026) 
         
County FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Owner FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2,054  2,054  2,054  2,054 
R-squared  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.75 
Notes. Column 2 adds lnPrivEmp to (1). Column 3 adds PopDensity to (1). Robust standard errors clustered 
on establishments are in parentheses. MW2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August 2008 - January 2009. 
Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in 
the last column is the log of total hours (regular + overtime) hours. In line 2, lnGAP is the initial lnGAP1 
prior to the first MW increase. ∆lnSales is lagged two periods. * designates significance at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 6C. Pooled OLS, determinants of employment and aggregate hours,  
3
rd MW increase: January 2009 - December 2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnEmp  lnHours 
lnGAP3∙MW3  0.454  0.456  0.454  0.312 
  (0.397)  (0.396)  (0.397)  (0.277) 
lnGAP  -0.610  -0.610  -0.610  -1.051 
  (1.570)  (1.571)  (1.570)  (1.192) 
MW3  -0.024  -0.027  -0.024  -0.016 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.019) 
∆ lnSales   0.076*  0.074*  0.076*  0.175* 
  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.025) 
      (0.000)   
County FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Owner FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1,892  1,892  1,892  1,892 
R-squared  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.76 
Notes. Column 2 adds lnPrivEmp to (1). Column 3 adds PopDensity to (1). Robust standard errors clustered 
on establishments are in parentheses. MW3 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in August 2009 - December 2009. 
Dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of average bi-weekly employment; the dependent variable in 
the last column is the log of total hours (regular + overtime) hours. In line 2, lnGAP is the initial lnGAP1 
prior to the first MW increase. ∆lnSales is lagged two periods. * designates significance at the .05 level. 
 